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All usWe use Spain’s Equality Law to test for the existence of agency prob-
lems between party leaders and their constituents. The law mandates a
40 percent female quota on electoral lists in towns with populations
above 5,000. Using pre- and postquota data by party and municipality,
we implement a triple-difference design. We find that female quotas
resulted in slightly better electoral results for the parties that were most
affected by the quota. Our evidence shows that party leaders were not
maximizing electoral results prior to the quota, suggesting the existence
of agency problems that hinder female representation in political in-
stitutions.I. Introduction
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Allwomen do not reach influential positions more often. Women could
generally be “unwilling” to run for office. They may prefer alternative oc-
cupations, perhaps because they offer a better balance between profes-
sional and personal life. This could potentially leave a less competitive
pool of available female candidates. Voters may have preferences for male
representatives, rendering female candidates relatively “unpopular.” Par-
ties would therefore rationally respond to this bias by fielding fewer
women candidates. Alternatively, party leaders, who historically have been
men, may decide to field fewer women at the expense of lowering votes.
This practice may persist because of the inability of voters to control the
actions of their leaders. This paper shows that the existenceof such agency
problems between political leaders and voters leads to female underrep-
resentation, harming the political aspirations of women, and likely low-
ering the welfare of voters.
When party leaders act in the best interest of their constituents, they
select candidates to maximize electoral results. Hence, any constraint
imposed on the discretion of party elites should result in worse electoral
outcomes for those parties. We focus on the constraints imposed by
female quotas on the selection of candidates. Exploiting an exogenous
change in electoral rules, we test whether the introduction of female quo-
tas effectively changed the electoral results of affected parties.
Spain’s government passed the Equality Law in 2007 to promote gen-
der parity. The passage of the law—an indirect effect of the Madrid ter-
rorist bombings—had been completely unanticipated by local political
parties, candidates, and voters. It required parties to field lists for local
elections with a minimum of 40 percent female candidates. However, the
quotas applied only to municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants.
The law effectively increased the presence of women on the affected lists
by around 8 percentage points. This represented an increase of 27 per-
cent in the number of female candidates. Moreover, the law forced par-
ties to maintain the same minimum percentage of women in every five-
position bracket of the list. As a result, the number of women in the top
five positions also increased by a similar amount.
Using nonquota municipalities as controls and first-differencing vote
shares by party and town between 2003 and 2007, we can factor out local
and party-specific confounders as well as general changes in voters’ at-
titudes toward female politicians. We find that parties affected by the
quota increased their vote share by more than their counterparts in the
control group. Furthermore, parties that were forced to make larger rel-
ative increases in the number of female candidates slightly improved
their electoral performance relative to other parties within the same mu-
nicipality.
Voter turnout in the municipalities affected by the quota was not re-
duced as a result of the larger number of additional women candidates.This content downloaded from 149.169.211.205 on May 24, 2016 09:58:19 AM
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women and power 643Thus the evidence shows that, at the margin, voters seemed to be hap-
pier with more balanced lists. These results are not consistent with the
existence of substantial voter aversion to female candidates.
We also show that parties did not experience issues finding suitable
female candidates to comply with the quotas. The quota was not associ-
ated with increased list attrition or difficulties forming new lists. Parties
did not need to retain past female candidates more often or to promote
existing female candidates to top positions either. Together with the re-
sults on electoral outcomes, this evidence is not consistent with the exis-
tence of major supply constraints for high-quality female candidates.
There is a large literature on the agency conflicts between politicians
and voters ðBarro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Banks and Sundaram 1993; Pers-
son and Tabellini 2000; Maskin and Tirole 2004; Myerson 2008Þ. Although
there is evidence that voters hold politicians accountable ðBesley and Case
1995, 2003Þ, democratic institutions are unlikely to eliminate agency costs
entirely ðShleifer and Vishny 2002Þ. Our paper shows that such agency
problems lead to female underrepresentation, harming the political as-
pirations of women and likely lowering the welfare of voters.
There has also been considerable research trying to understand the
effect of female candidates on electoral outcomes, with mixed results
ðDolan 2004; Lawless and Fox 2010Þ. Surveys consistently show the im-
portance of gender stereotypes ðMcDermott 1997, 1998; Koch 2000; Law-
less 2004Þ. Women candidates are seen as more liberal, having an ad-
vantage in issues related to education, health, or poverty; however, men
are seen as more competent managers when the issues relate to econom-
ics, crime, or the military ðDolan 2005a, 2005bÞ. Polls also show that vot-
ers tend to vote for candidates of their own gender ðPlutzer and Zipp
1996; Smith and Fox 2001Þ.
However, the net effect of these findings on actual electoral results is
unclear. Most of the literature in political science finds that female can-
didates who run for office tend to win at rates similar to those of males
ðDarcy and Schramm 1977; Welch et al. 1985; Burrell 1992; Gaddie and
Bullock 1997; Fox and Oxley 2003Þ. Some papers claim that women can-
didates obtain fewer votes ðFrechette, Maniquet, andMorelli 2008Þ, while
others find a net positive effect ðHogan 2010Þ. The caveat is that these
studies are based on correlational evidence and suffer from ðiÞ endoge-
neity problems ðparties strategically choose candidate gender contingent
on expected resultsÞ1 and ðiiÞ omitted ability biases ðthey could reflect
voter discriminatory preferences that prevent all but the most extraor-
dinary women from entering competitive electionsÞ. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first attempt to measure the effect of female can-1 For instance, using data from the introduction of gender quotas in France at the na-
tional legislative level, Murray ð2008, 551Þ finds evidence that “women are indeed placed in
the most difficult seats” as candidates.
This content downloaded from 149.169.211.205 on May 24, 2016 09:58:19 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
644 journal of political economy
Alldidates on votes using a quasi-experimental design that exogenously in-
creased their number in a treatment group of municipalities and parties
and left a control group untreated. Thus, we can eliminate the effects of
potentially confounding factors on electoral outcomes.
Our paper complements previous evidence about the importance of
internal political party dynamics in accounting for female underrepre-
sentation ðSanbonmatsu 2002, 2006; Murray 2008; Bagues and Esteve-
Volart 2012Þ. It also relates to recent research on the policy effects of
women in power ðe.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Beaman et al.
2009Þ.2 This literature has focused mainly on the policy outcomes of
female elected leaders, the effects of quotas on the number of elected
women, or the change in attitudes toward women once they are elected,
and not on the intrinsic theories that could account for women’s
underrepresentation.
Our research follows an extensive literature on discrimination in labor
markets. There is evidence of gender discrimination in hiring ðGoldin
and Rouse 2000Þ and in product markets ðAyres and Siegelman 1995Þ. A
related literature on ethnic discrimination has studied market-driven pref-
erences for residential segregation ðe.g., Saiz and Wachter 2011Þ and in
other less conventional environments ðKahn 2000; Szymanski 2000; Price
and Wolfers 2010Þ. Municipal elections allow us to study a relevant set-
ting, yet one in which a very good performance measure is available: elec-
toral results.
Finally, the paper is distantly related to an emerging literature that
tries to explain gender inequality in outcomes using differences in tastes
and attitudes ðCrosson andGneezy 2008Þ.Women tend todisplay negative
attitudes toward competition ðGneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003;
Gneezy andRustichini 2004;Niederle andVesterlun2007Þ. They also tend
to see themselves as less qualified to run for office ðFox and Lawless 2004;
Lawless and Fox 2005Þ. These theories could explain why the average
woman may be less likely to seek power. However, they cannot by them-
selves account for the lack of women at the top. In competitive environ-
ments, there couldbe enoughwomenat the right tails of the ambition and
ability distributions to satisfy a demand for more balanced gender allo-2 The literature on the impact of women in power on parliamentary votes, budget levels,
budget composition, government stability, and government efficiency is now quite large.
Note that we do not have much to contribute to this specific literature since we are not
examining the policy impact of the additional elected women due to the quota. Instead, we
use the natural experiment to learn about the causes of female underrepresentation on the
candidate lists. For the reader interested in women politicians and their effect on policy,
other examples of this burgeoning literature include Welch ð1985Þ, Swers ð1998Þ, Rehavi
ð2007Þ, Clots-Figueras ð2009Þ, De Paola, Scoppa, and Lombardo ð2010Þ, Ferreira and Gyourko
ð2010Þ, Funk and Gathman ð2010Þ, Cavalcanti and Tavares ð2011Þ, and Gagliarducci and Pa-
serman ð2012Þ. Campa ð2011Þ is themost relevant reference to our work: it studies the impact
of quotas in Spain on the provision of public goods.
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-cations. We argue that one cannot fully understand female underrepre
sentation in positions of power without considering the interaction
between the demand side of political markets ðvoter preferencesÞ, the
marginal supply of qualified female candidates, and the industrial or
ganization of the market: the role of parties, political leaders, and the
degree of competition ðBecker 1957Þ.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we develop a simple
model of electoral competition. The model shows that introducing a
female quota cannot possibly lead to better electoral results for the af
fected party under vote-maximizing behavior. Section III describes the
experimental design and data, and Section IV presents the results. We
offer concluding remarks in Section V.II. Female Representation and Quotas: Framework
Consider two political parties competing in an electoral contest. Each
party selects the candidates to place on the ballot. We further assume
that they choose ballots to maximize their expected vote shares. The se
lection of candidates is constrained by the distributions of characteristics
among the pools of potential candidates available to their parties.
The expected vote share for party 1 is ∫g ðx1; x 2; nÞdF ðnÞ, where gðx1, x2
nÞ is the vote share of party 1, xi is a K-dimensional vector that describes
the characteristics of the candidates that party i ∈ f1, 2g places on the
ballot, and n is a random shock that captures the influence of factors that
voters observe during the campaign but that party officials cannot ob
serve when choosing candidates. We assume that n is orthogonal to both
x1 and x2. Because there are only two parties, this is a zero-sum game.
We denote the pool of candidates available to party i by the set Qi ⊂ RK
so that xi ∈ Qi , and we assume that Qi is bounded. These sets capture the
idea that parties face trade-offs because they have finite resources for re
cruiting candidates and a finite pool of potential candidates.
Assume that there exists a Nash equilibrium to this game, ðx*1 ; x*2Þ
Now suppose that party 1 has to choose candidates from the set Q^1 such
that Q^1 ⊂ Q1 and x*1 ∉ Q^1. Party 1 is therefore constrained to select a bal
lot from a subset of the original set of candidates that does not contain
the party’s equilibrium strategy. On the other hand, the strategy set for
party 2 remains unchanged. Further, let ðx^*1; x^*2Þ be some Nash equilib
rium of the new game.
Proposition 1. The expected vote share for party 1 given any Nash
equilibrium of the new game is weakly less than the expected vote share
for party 1 in the original game, that is,
Eg ðx^*1; x^*2; nÞdF ðnÞ ≤ Eg ðx*1 ; x*2 ; nÞdF ðnÞ:ago.edu/t-and-c).
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AllProof. Because this is a two-player, zero-sum game, party 1 seeks to
maximize its expected vote share while party 2 seeks to minimize party 1’s
expected vote share. Since Nash equilibria involve both players choos-
ing best responses, we have
Eg ðx^*1; x*2; nÞdF ðnÞ ≤ Eg ðx*1 ; x*2; nÞdF ðnÞ
because x^*1 is not a best response to x*2 . Further, we also have that
Eg ðx^*1; x^*2; nÞdF ðnÞ ≤ Eg ðx^*1; x*2; nÞdF ðnÞ
because x*2 is not a best response to x^*1. Combining both inequalities yields
the result. Q.E.D.
Party 1 chose its original equilibrium strategy in a game in which both
parties were trying to maximize their own expected vote shares. As a re-
sult, party 1 cannot expect a higher vote share following the introduc-
tion of a policy that eliminates its ability to choose a strategy that it played
in the equilibrium of the original game. Thus, if party 1 gets more votes,
on average, following the introduction of such a policy, wemust conclude
that in the previous regime the two parties were not playing a vote share–
maximizing strategy. The result suggests a simple explanation for our find-
ing below that female quotas improve the electoral results of affected par-
ties: quotas force some local party officials to choose female candidates that
were “better”—in the sense of maximizing vote share—but party insiders
preferred not to field them in the first place.
While this result does not generalize to N party settings without ad-
ditional assumptions, we have established conditions such that the result
does hold when party 1 faces more than one opponent.3 Also, in our em-
pirical work below, we present analyses in which we restrict the sample to
municipalities that are dominated by two parties.III. Experimental Environment
Town councilors in Spain are elected using closed lists ði.e., people vote
for a list rather than for an individual personÞ. Most lists concur under
the umbrella of national or regional parties. Each list must present a
number of candidates equal to the number of council seats at stake.4 The3 The results are available from the authors on request.
4 For example, the number of seats is 11 for municipalities between 2,000 and 5,000 in-
habitants and 13 formunicipalities between 5,000 and 10,000. Note that, in 2003, 94 percent
of the lists in these population ranges obtained fewer than seven seats, and only one list in
about 30,000 reached 11 seats. In practice, therefore, all candidates appearing after num-
bers 7–8 on a list can generally be understood as “filler” candidates.
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women and power 647seats are apportioned proportionally to vote shares using the d’Hont
method. The law, however, establishes a minimum vote threshold of
5 percent in order for a list to qualify for the apportionment of seats.
Council members are drawn from each list using the exact order in
which the candidates are listed. Upon convening for the first time, the
council elects a mayor, typically the first person on the most-voted list.5
The council also acts as a representative legislative body, passing and en-
acting all local budgets, laws, regulations, zoning, and tax codes for a pe-
riod of 4 years.
On March 22, 2007, the Law for the Equality of Women and Men ðthe
Equality Law henceforthÞ was passed by the Spanish Parliament. It re-
quired candidate lists in all elections to contain at least 40 percent of
candidates from each gender. Moreover, in order to prevent parties from
placing all women at the bottom of the list, the law required this pro-
portion to be maintained for every bracket of five positions. Importantly,
the law declared municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants exempt
from the quota.
The law applied for the first time to the municipal elections held on
May 27, 2007. In the previous election of May 25, 2003, no such legal
change had been contemplated. Indeed, the passage of the law was made
possible by the 2004 general election results, which were largely unantic-
ipated ðMontalvo 2011Þ. Only days before the Madrid train bombings of
March 11, 2004, the Christian-Democratic Party ðPPÞ was widely expected
to win the elections. The bombings and postattack management from the
incumbent party changed the sentiment of many voters toward the Social-
Democratic Party ðPSOEÞ, which won the elections 4 days after the terror-
ist strike.6 It is therefore quite unlikely that the share of female candidates
in the municipal elections of 2003 reflected an anticipation of the female
quotas that were imposed in 2007.
The Spanish State Department ðMinisterio del InteriorÞ collects infor-
mation related to the electoral process. On request, we obtained a non-
confidential subset of its data. We were provided with the names of all
candidates by list in all municipal ballots in the 2007 and 2003 elections,
their gender in 2007 ða disclosure required by the Equality LawÞ, their
list’s affiliation with major parties, information about each individual’s
position on the lists, and the outcome of their candidacy.7 We imputed
gender in 2003 by using the first name of the candidate. Names in Spain
have a very strong gender orientation, and only a very small portion of
candidates in 2003 had gender-ambiguous names. We also have infor-5 In fact, only the first person on each list can be considered in the initial mayoral vote.
6 Gender parity in lists had been an important point in PSOE’s electoral platform ðVerge
2006Þ.
7 Other characteristics, such as birth date, were suppressed from the data for confi-
dentiality reasons.
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Allmation about the number of votes for all lists presented, the fraction of
null or blank votes, estimated populations in the municipal census, and
the number of registered voters in each town.
Since the law applied only to municipalities with more than 5,000 in-
habitants, we can obtain meaningful results only around this threshold.
In order to ensure both comparability and large enough sample sizes, we
restrict our study to municipalities with populations below 10,000 inhab-
itants. However, the results are not in the least sensitive to variations in
this threshold. We also utilize data on unemployment rates ða very good
local socioeconomic status indicator in SpainÞ and other economic char-
acteristics of the towns. Results do not change with the inclusion of these
controls and are omitted inasmuch as most specifications are in first dif-
ferences. Furthermore, observables are invariant around the population
level at which the quota binds. In contrast, there is a very strong effect of
the quota on the number of women across lists on both sides of this dis-
continuity: a differential increase of 8 percentage points in towns with
populations above 5,000 ðsee table 6 in Sec. IV.DÞ. This figure amounts
to a differential 27 percent increase in the number of women on lists in
the towns affected by the quota.8IV. Do Voters Dislike Female Politicians? Evidence
A. Women and Electoral Results: Descriptive Evidence
While the political slogan “when women run, women win” has been used
to promote female political candidacy, the issue of the impact of women
on electoral results is ultimately an empirical one. An extensive literature
has studied the impact of parties fielding female candidates. Previous ap-
proaches were based on either studying self-reported voter preferences as
captured in surveys or comparing outcomes by gender in single-candidate
elections. The former approach may not faithfully capture actual behav-
ior or provide reliable field predictions. Results from the latter approach
need to be interpreted with caution: because the share of women running
for office is low, those who actually run constitute a very selected group
ðAnzia and Berry 2011Þ. Finding no gender differences in vote shares be-
tween marginal candidates is completely consistent with the existence of
general voter biases against women; these biases could explain why only
a relatively small percentage of extremely capable female candidates can
afford to compete.8 Women amounted to 30 percent of the total number of candidates in the 2003 mu-
nicipal elections in towns with populations below 10,000—the ones we study here. Results
about the causal impact of the quota on female representation are robust to considering
alternative control-treatment samples and to the inclusion of polynomials in population,
municipal fixed effects, and other controls. See Campa ð2011Þ and Casas-Arce and Saiz
ð2011Þ for further analyses.
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women and power 649In order to illustrate the pitfalls of correlational approaches and to
better understand the patterns of women’s participation before the quo-
tas, we begin by showing the associations between the share of women on
lists and electoral outcomes in 2003. We focus on small towns with popu-
lations below 10,000—our sample of interest. The dependent variable in
table 1 is the voting share, and the unit of observation is each of the 14,333
party lists competing in the relevant 4,582 municipalities. The main de-
pendent variable is the share of women in the top five positions of each
list as, presumably, women vying for top positions were more visible to vot-
ers. We will focus on the overall female share in Section IV.C.9
The descriptive evidence in table 1, column 1, shows that lists with
more women at the top fared significantly worse in the elections of 2003.
The results are robust to including municipal ðcol. 2Þ and party ðcol. 3Þ
fixed effects. In column 4, we focus on the two major national parties,
which amounted to 60 percent of lists and 67 percent of votes in our
sample. We find that whenever one of the major national parties fielded
a relatively large number of women, it tended to fare worse. These nega-
tive results are quantitatively large, suggesting that increasing the female
share of candidates at the top by 20 percent ðone womanÞ was associated
with a loss in vote share of 3.7 percentage points ðabout 10 percent of the
average vote shareÞ.
As in previous correlational studies, this evidence cannot be inter-
preted as capturing voters’ gender preferences or candidate ability. In
fact, reverse causality is likely a major issue. In panel B of table 1, we run
the inverse regression with the female candidate share on the left-hand
side, focusing on the two main national parties. Were the main parties
systematically fielding fewer women in municipalities where they were
likely to win more seats? To test this hypothesis, we instrument each
party’s vote share in the 2003 municipal elections using the vote share
they obtain, at the municipal level, in the 1999 European Parliament
elections. The candidates and substantive issues in such elections are com-
mon to the whole country and are completely unrelated to local elections.
While European elections are widely perceived as irrelevant by voters, they
elicit general political sentiment for or against the major national parties
ðBinzer Hobolt and Wittrock 2011Þ. This measure of general political
orientation in the town is very strongly associated with the local vote for
one or the other party in municipal elections: the R2 in the first stage of
two-stage least squares ð2SLSÞ is .49.10 The results of this instrumental9 Results are very similar if we focus on the total share of women on the lists. In these
local elections, many voters can be swayed to vote for a list because of personal or family
relationships with the candidateðsÞ, regardless of their position on the lists.
10 Sole´-Olle´ and Viladecans-Marsal ð2012Þ show that local ideological preferences for
each party in Spain are very persistent over time ðsince the first democratic elections in
1978Þ and do affect the outcomes of municipal elections.
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TABLE 1
Observational Association between Female Participation
and Electoral Results
A. Lists with More Women at the Top Tend
to Obtain Fewer Votes: Share of Total
Votes for List in 2003 Elections
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ
hare of women in list
ðtop five positionsÞ 2.112*** 2.129*** 2.136*** 2.186***
ð.009Þ ð.012Þ ð.011Þ ð.019Þ
unicipality fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
arty fixed effects No No Yes Yes
imit to only two main
national parties No No No Yes
ðListsÞ 14,333 14,333 14,333 8,503
unicipalities 4,582 4,582 4,582 4,441
B. Mostly Due to Reverse Causation:
Share of Women on List
ðTop Five PositionsÞ
OLS
ð1Þ
IV: Vote Shares in 1999
European Elections
ð2Þ ð3Þ
hare of total votes for list
in 2003 elections 2.129*** 2.108*** 2.100***
ð.013Þ ð.017Þ ð.036Þ
ist wins 2003 elections 2.005
ð.010Þ
unicipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
arty fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
nly two main parties Yes Yes Yes
a 8,114 8,114 8,114
unicipalities 4,057 4,057 4,057
-test of excluded
instruments NA 2,567 1,059
-value of Sargan test NA .0025 .002
Note.—H0: Parameter 5 0. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The results in
anel A display estimates of the OLS coefficients of the share of women in the top five
ositions of a party’s list on the total vote share won by that list in the 2003 municipa
lections. Column 1 displays uncontrolled regressions; col. 2 introduces municipality fixed
ffects ðall the variation is in the female share within a townÞ; col. 3 introduces major
olitical party fixed effects; and col. 4 is limited to the lists fielded by the two larger nationa
arties, PP and PSOE. Panel B focuses on the two major national parties ðPP and PSOEÞ. I
ows the reverse regression in which the share of women in the top five positions in the
arty list in 2003 is the dependent variable and the share of votes in 2003 is the main
xplanatory variable. With unbiased expectations, the average share of votes should proxy
r ex ante expectations about electoral outcomes. Column 1 limits the estimation to mu
icipalities where both PP and PSOE presented a list ð89 percent of all relevant munic
alitiesÞ. In col. 2 we use a 2SLS specification and instrument for the share of votes won by
e two major parties by municipality in 2003 with the parties’ vote share in that locality in
e 1999 European elections. We restrict all estimates in the table to municipalities with
opulations below 10,000 inhabitants in order to make the results comparable with those
other tables.
a The number of lists from PSOE and PP with European 1999 data.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
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women and power 651variables ðIVÞ strategy ðtable 1, panel B, col. 2Þ are statistically indistin-
guishable from the ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ reverse causation equa-
tion ðtable 1, panel B, col. 1Þ. They suggest that the correlation between
the share of female candidates and electoral results is drivenby the actions
of parties, not by the preferences of voters.
Of course, it is possible that the local parties that were likely to win in
2003 had already been in power previously. Historically, executive teams
have tended to be male. Furthermore, it seems likely that parties could
try to minimize turnover in governing teams. Nevertheless, controlling
for the lists’ winning the 2003 elections ði.e., obtaining the highest vote
shareÞ does not change the results ðtable 1, panel B, col. 3, including a
dummy for the most-voted listsÞ. Nonwinner lists that expected to in-
crease their number of seats in the local legislative body tended to de-
crease their share of women at the top. Rather than winning elections, it
seemed to be winning seats that changed the internal party dynamics of
female promotion. Note that “winner status” is certainly an endogenous
regressor that should be negatively associated with the female candidate
share if voters really disliked female-laden governing teams ðas opposed
to women on nongoverning listsÞ. However, both variables happen to be
uncorrelated after controlling for vote shares.
It is clear that in towns where a party was generally strong and ex-
pected to gain many seats in the municipal elections, fewer women placed
on its list. Conversely, more women ran for office in towns where the
party was in a more competitive situation. These results are consistent
with agency problems between political leaders and voters pushing
women aside from positions of power. They also illustrate the difficulties
associated with studying female electoral success in a context of substan-
tial endogeneity.B. A Natural Experiment Induced by the Quota:
“Bipartisan Male Holdout” Lists
The previous results do not conclusively prove the existence of agency
problems that hinder female advancement. Fortunately, the introduction
of the Equality Law provides us with an experimental design that is akin to
the random forceful introduction of more women onto the electoral lists
where they used to be underrepresented. If the vote-maximizing best re-
sponse of a party was to include fewer women, the new constraint on be-
havior should reduce its vote share.
We focus on a subset of lists in which the competitive environment was
well defined and the quota was uniquely binding. Specifically, we begin
by focusing on municipalities where the two most-voted lists obtained a
joint share of more than 80 percent of the council seats in the 2003 local
elections and also fielded lists in 2007: we call these bipartisan towns. WeThis content downloaded from 149.169.211.205 on May 24, 2016 09:58:19 AM
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Allfurther limit our attention to municipalities where one of the main par-
ties was initially fielding less than 40 percent of females ðwe call these lists
“male holdouts”Þ while their main competitor was already above that
threshold in the 2003 elections. Towns with a male holdout list are inter-
esting to study because only one of the major parties was affected by
the quota, and we can directly apply the conceptual test in proposition 1.
If parties were maximizing vote shares in 2003, we expect the party af-
fected by the quota to fare worse in 2007.11
We implement a difference-in-differences matching design ðSmith
and Todd 2005Þ by comparing changes in vote shares before and after
the quota, across male holdout lists in quota and nonquota bipartisan
municipalities. Of all bipartisan towns with a single male holdout list and
a population under 10,000, we have only 144 in which the quota became
binding by law in 2007. There were 1,345 bipartisan towns with one male
holdout list that remained unaffected by the quota in 2007 ðpopulations
below 5,000Þ. Thus, we have many more observations in the nonquota
group. Furthermore, the observable characteristics of male holdout lists
in the quota and nonquota groups are somewhat different ðtable 2Þ.
Treatment and control groups that differ on observables should not
be directly compared ðLaLonde 1986; Heckman et al. 1998Þ; therefore,
we estimate a propensity score equation to produce a closely compara-
ble control group. Specifically, we first estimate the equation on a quota
dummy using observable characteristics and match each of the 144 ob-
servations in the “quota male holdout” group with the 10 closest “non-
quota male holdout” observations by propensity score ðwith repetitionÞ.12
Importantly, results are not sensitive to changing the matching technique
or the number of matched control observations. Table 2 shows that
matchingon thepropensity scoredoes very well in selectingnonquota lists
that were ex ante similar to those in the quota sample. Note that by taking
first differences on the outcome of interest, we mitigate other potential
omitted variables problems ðSmith and Todd 2005Þ.
In table 3 we compare the evolution of male holdout parties across
quota ðtreatmentÞ and nonquota ðcontrolÞ bipartisan municipalities.
While the major list competing with the male holdout party in each of
these towns was not forced to increase its female share, it could have
done so as a best reaction to the changes by the male holdouts. There-
fore, we cross-tabulate the main outcome of interest—the 2003–7 change11 In an earlier version, we used an alternative sample including all municipalities ðnot
necessarily bipartisanÞ with a single male holdout list in 2003. The results, available from
the authors on request, are unchanged.
12 Each thusly paired “control” observation is given a weight of 1/10. Since many of the
control observations are matched to several treatment observations, we end up with 591
comparable male holdout lists in municipalities where the quota did not apply. We use the
routine “psmatch2” by Leuven and Sianesi ð2012Þ.
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TABLE 2
Male Holdout Lists in Bipartisan Elections: Observable Characteristics
Nonquota Differences
Quota:
All
ð1Þ
All
ð2Þ
Weighted Matched
Sample
ð3Þ
Raw
ð1Þ2 ð2Þ
ð4Þ
Matched
ð1Þ2 ð3Þ
ð5Þ
Initial vote share .45 .49 .45 2.04*** .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Initial share of women on list .17 .14 .17 .03*** .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Initial electoral participation .73 .78 .73 2.06*** .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Number of parties in election 3.94 2.96 3.90 .99*** .05
ð.09Þ ð.03Þ ð.05Þ ð.09Þ ð.09Þ
Initial Herfindahl index ðvote
sharesÞ .42 .49 .42 2.07*** .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Socialist Party ðPSOEÞ .24 .32 .23 2.08** .01
ð.04Þ ð.01Þ ð.02Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ
Conservative Party ðPPÞ .55 .49 .56 .05 2.01
ð.04Þ ð.01Þ ð.02Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
Izquierda Unida ðIUÞ .05 .03 .04 .02 .01
ð.02Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya ðERCÞ .03 .02 .03 .00 .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Convergencia I Unio ðCIUÞ .06 .05 .06 .01 .00
ð.02Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Partido Andalucista ðPAÞ .01 .01 .01 .00 .00
ð.01Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Bloque Nationalista Galego
ðBNGÞ .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Numberof lists/municipalities 144 1,354 591 1,498 735
Note.—H0: |difference in means| > 0. Entries are the means and standard deviations ðin
parenthesesÞ of the observable variables that apply to male holdout lists in bipartisan
elections. Some of the characteristics pertain to the lists and some to the municipalities in
which the lists competed. Bipartisan male holdout lists are defined by the following char
acteristics: ðiÞ they were one of the two most-voted parties in their municipality in 2003 and
participated also in the 2007 elections; ðiiÞ they are in municipalities where the two most
voted parties obtained 80 percent or more of the council seats in 2003; ðiiiÞ these lists were
fielding less than 40 percent of female candidates in 2003, while their main competitor
were already above that level in the 2003 elections. In col. 1, we show descriptives for two
party male holdout lists in municipalities where the quota became binding in 2007 ðpop
ulations between 5,000 and 10,000Þ. In col. 2, we show data for municipalities where the
quota did not apply in 2007 ðpopulations between 0 and 5,000Þ. In col. 3, we present de
scriptive statistics for those male holdout municipalities that we matched to the quota one
using propensity scores. In order to calculate propensity scores, we used all the variables in
this table to fit a quota-dummy logit model. We then matched each observation in the
quota group to the 10 closest observations in the nonquota group based on the estimated
propensity score, allowing for repetition across matches. Columns 4 and 5 present tests o
differences in means between the quota and the broader and matched nonquota samples
respectively. While quota and nonquota observations are very different, we cannot rejec
equality in averages across the quota and matched nonquota groups.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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TABLE 3
Evolution of Vote Shares of Male Holdout Lists in Bipartisan Elections
Average Change in Vote Share of Male
Holdout Lists between 2003 and 2007 by
Number of Women in Competitor Party
Unchanged
ð1Þ
Increasing
ð2Þ
Decreasing
ð3Þ
All
ð4Þ
Matched Municipalities in Which the
Quota Did Not Become Binding
. List had less than 40% women in 2003
and 2007 2.061 2.070 2.065 2.063
ð.009Þ ð.017Þ ð.013Þ ð.007Þ
N complier control 153 49 132 334
. List had less than 40% women in 2003
but 40% or more in 2007 2.021 2.088 2.030 2.033
ð.010Þ ð.015Þ ð.014Þ ð.007Þ
N noncomplier control 134 38 85 257
. Overall in control lists 2.042 2.079 2.052 2.050
ð.007Þ ð.011Þ ð.010Þ ð.005Þ
N in control 287 87 217 591
Quota Binding
. List was bound by the quota in 2007 2.020 2.001 .060 2.009
ð.008Þ ð.016Þ ð.032Þ ð.007Þ
N in treatment quota 100 31 13 144
Treatment Effects
. Average effect of a binding quota .022 .078 .113 .042
ð.010Þ ð.018Þ ð.022Þ ð.008Þ
. Wald estimate of effect of gender parity .042 .147 .176 .074
ð.019Þ ð.039Þ ð.038Þ ð.014Þ
Note.—All coefficients in rows 5 and 6 are statistically different from zero with p -test
alues such that p < .01. Each cell in this table displays average changes in vote shares
etween 2003 and 2007 among male holdout lists in bipartisan towns in 2003 that also
ompeted in 2007. See table 2 for the definition of bipartisan male holdout lists. Rows 1–4
ross-tabulate data by quota compliance in 2007 and by the average reaction of lists com-
eting in the same municipalities as male holdouts ðcols. 1–4Þ. Rows 1–4 show average
hanges in voting shares, displayed together with estimated standard errors of their means
in parenthesesÞ and the number of observations in each cell. Nonquota observations cor-
espond to the propensity score–matched observations in table 2, col. 3. Row 1 focuses on lists
towns where the quota did not apply and that fielded less than 40 percent of female
andidates in the top five positions ðcompliers with their control ½nonquota assignmentÞ.
ow 2 focuses on data for lists that were in nonquota towns but decided to apply the 40 percent
uota ðnoncompliers with their control ½nonquota assignmentÞ. Row 3 shows average vote
are changes for all nonquota observations. Row 4 shows average vote share changes for male
oldout lists that were affected by the quota in 2007. Row 5 presents average differences in
utcomes between quota and nonquota observations and corresponding standard errors in
arentheses. Row 6 presents Wald estimates ðand standard errors in parenthesesÞ that ad-
st for the actual probability of receiving the 40 percent female treatment between quota
nd nonquota groups. Column 1 focuses on male holdout lists in towns where the compet-
g parties had changed their female share between 2003 and 2007 by less than 10 per-
entage points on average ðvote-weightedÞ. Column 2 displays results for male holdout lists
municipalities where all other lists increased their female share in 2007 by more than
0 percentage points. Column 3 shows estimates for male holdout lists in municipalities
here all other lists decreased their female share in 2007 by more than 10 percentage points.
All1
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Column 4 shows aggregate results for all male holdout lists in the quota andmatched control
samples.
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women and power 655in vote share of the male holdout list—by the reaction of its competitor
ðcolumnsÞ, based on whether its female share did not change ðcol. 1Þ, in-
creased ðcol. 2Þ, or decreased ðcol. 3Þ in 2007. Our focus is on column 1,
where only male holdout lists substantially changed female representa-
tion as a result of the quota ðrepresenting 70 percent of the treatment
groupÞ.
In the first row we examine male holdout lists in which the quota was
not enforced and that kept fewer than two women in the top five posi-
tions in 2007 ðcompliersÞ. These lists suffered a substantial drop in vote
share between elections. Noncomplier lists in the control group ðlists that
increased their female share to at least 40 percent, despite not being
required to do soÞ experienced a lower reduction in vote shares ðrow 2Þ,
and so did the lists that were actually subject to the quota ðrow 3Þ.
There was a substantial number of noncomplying lists that were not
bound by the quota but behaved as if they were. This could be due to
general social change favoring more women at the top but also may have
been related to an “encouragement effect” of the law. In this environ-
ment, Wald IV estimates are useful in comparing relative changes in
outcomes to relative probabilities of receiving the actual treatment of
interest. We therefore present both the binding-quota effect proper ðthe
overall difference between quota and nonquota groupsÞ—in row 5—and
a Wald IV estimate of the local treatment effect of moving toward gen-
der parity in the top positions—in row 6.13 We obtain the latter by divid-
ing the former effect by the difference in the probability of receiving a
gender-parity treatment ðfielding at least 40 percent women candidatesÞ
across municipalities above and below the 5,000 population threshold.
In column 4, we present these results aggregating across reaction func-
tions of competing parties. Contrary to the previous correlations, lists with
growing numbers of women at the top ðvoluntarily or forcedÞ tended to
see slightly better electoral outcomes.
The results in table 3 are clearly inconsistent with a negative impact of
women candidates on electoral outcomes. However, as demonstrated in
LaLonde ð1986Þ, nonparametric treatment effect estimates could be sen-
sitive to specification and the composition of the treatment and control
samples. Taking first differences in the outcome of interest and making
the samples comparable by matching may attenuate—but not totally
eliminate—these problems ðHeckman et al. 1998; Smith and Todd 2005Þ.
Thus, in table 4 we extend the analysis to the whole ðunmatchedÞ sam-
ple of male holdout lists in bipartisan towns. We start by repeating the
previous difference-in-differences ðcol. 1Þ and Wald IV ðcol. 2Þ specifica-
tions, using changes in voting share between 2003 and 2007 as the main13 Because the law mandates a gender quota in the top five positions, the closest that it
can come to parity is a 40 percent minimum.
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TABLE 4
Parametric Effect of Quota on Male Holdout Lists in Bipartisan Elections
DShare of Vote 2003–7 Share of Vote in 2007
OLS
IV 5 Quota
Dummy OLS
IV 5 Quota
Dummy
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ
uota was enforced .026** .022***
ð.011Þ ð.010Þ
ender parity in top five
positions ðWald IVÞ .046** .071*** .054**
ð.020Þ ð.026Þ ð.025Þ
ist’s 2003 share of vote .145 .140
ð.108Þ ð.118Þ
ist’s 2003 share of vote squared .678*** .692***
ð.123Þ ð.133Þ
ist’s initial female share in the
top five .036 2.018
ð.024Þ ð.037Þ
itial vote share Herfindahl
index in town 2.382*** 2.387***
ð.027Þ ð.027Þ
umber of parties in
election in town 2.052*** 2.052***
ð.006Þ ð.006Þ
itial voter turnout in town .016 .002
ð.062Þ ð.053Þ
ain party fixed effects No No No Yes Yes
uadratic in population levels No No No Yes Yes
imit to population between
4,000 and 6,000 No No Yes No No
2 .004 .624
bservations 1,498 1,498 123 1,498 1,498
-test of excluded instruments . . . 994.74 40.119 . . . 62.985
Note.—Standard errors, clustered at the region level, are in parentheses. Column 1
resents OLS regressions with the change in vote share by electoral list between 2003 and
007 as the dependent variable. All male holdout electoral lists in bipartisan municipalities
ith populations below 10,000 are included. See table 2 for the definition of bipartisan
ale holdout lists. Column 2 shows the counterpart IV regression in which we instrument
r changes to gender parity in the list using a “quota applies” dummy. Column 3 restricts
e IV regressions to municipalities with populations between 4,000 and 6,000. Column 4
resents results from anOLS specification in which the vote share by list in 2007 is the main
ependent variable. We then control for a quadratic in vote shares in 2003 and other
ontrols, including political party fixed effects and a quadratic in population levels. The
ain independent variables are a dummy for the Equality Law ðthe quota is binding in
unicipalities with populations above 5,000Þ. Column 5 shows the equivalent IV specifi-
ation.
* p < .1.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
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women and power 657dependent variable.14 Column 3 repeats the IVestimates formale holdout
lists in towns with populations between 4,000 and 6,000, close to the
threshold aroundwhich thequotawas imposed.While the sample ismuch
reduced and the instrument much weaker, the results are similar.
In column 4, we focus on the vote share level in 2007 for each male
holdout list as the main dependent variable. We then control paramet-
rically for lagged vote share in 2003 and its square, party fixed effects,
and characteristics of the municipalities: a polynomial in the town’s pop-
ulation, the number of lists in the election, the 2003 Herfindahl index,
and a quadratic in lagged voter turnout.15 Column 5 presents the Wald
IV estimates, where we instrument for the list moving to gender parity
with a dummy for the quota being enforced in its town. Using the broad-
est control group and parametric methods, we find that forcing male hold-
out lists to gender parity increased their vote share by about 5.4 percent-
agepoints, representinganexchangeofabout118votes inthe localelections
under consideration.
Again, we can reject the hypothesis that male holdout lists that were
forced to enact gender parity fared worse. In fact, the evidence is more
consistent with the view that they tended to do slightly better, suggesting
that political leaders were not maximizing electoral results prior to the
introduction of the quota.C. Relative Growth of Female Candidates and Vote Share
We now generalize our results to all candidates and electoral lists af-
fected by the quota. It is well known that “friends and neighbors” of can-
didates have a strong impact on the outcomes of local elections ðKey and
Heard 1949; Smith 2010Þ. New female candidates may have been effec-
tive in canvasing voters from their social networks in the relatively small
towns that we study, irrespective of whether they were likely to be elected
themselves. Furthermore, in many towns, several or even all parties were
affected by the quota, but to different degrees: those with fewer women
were forced to field more. We can therefore use the larger variation in
the effects of the quota on the total share of women on the lists to es-
timate the broader impact of female candidates on relative electoral
outcomes.
In order to motivate this broader empirical approach, we start by
showing—in table 5, column 1—that the further a list was forced by the
quota to increase its number of female candidates, the better it fared14 Standard errors in all regressions henceforth are clustered at the regional level, but
they are not sensitive to the level of geographical clustering ðBarrios et al. 2012Þ.
15 The coefficients on a quadratic in population are highly insignificant: there is no
evidence of additional trends in changes in vote shares for male holdout lists across towns
of different population levels.
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women and power 659in the 2003 elections. The unit of observation in the OLS regression is
each of the municipal lists concurring in the 2003 and 2007 elections.
The dependent variable—on the left-hand side—is the change in the
vote share of each list. The main independent variable is Dki  ð0.4 2
FemShki,03Þ, where Dki is a dummy that takes value one if municipality i’s
population in 2007 was above 5,000 and party k’s female share in 2003
ðdenoted by FemShki,03Þ was below 40 percent. The further away a list was
from the quota in the towns where it was binding, the more women it was
forced to incorporate. Of course, voter preferences could be changing
over time, affecting parties with different initial numbers of women in
different ways. Therefore, we also control for a quadratic in the initial
list’s share of women in 2003 on the right-hand side in all specifications
in table 5.16 Municipal fixed effects are included in all specifications as
well. If all lists in a town were similarly affected by the Equality Law, we
would not expect the quota to have much effect on vote shares. By con-
trolling for town fixed effects, we are effectively looking at deviations of
the change in the number of women and vote shares relative to their
town’s averages. Finally, we include main party fixed effects ðe.g., PSOE,
PPÞ to account for broader changes in political sentiment and weight all
observations—party lists—by their vote share in 2003 to obtain voter
representative results.
The regression considers 11,556 repeat lists in 4,364 municipalities.
The results ðtable 5, col. 1Þ indicate that lists in quota towns that were
forced to increase their female representation more dramatically fared
relatively better, gaining voting share. Note that we are first-differencing
the dependent variable, controlling for initial female shares ðincluding
a quadratic termÞ, and saturating the model with town and party fixed
effects. It is thus extremely difficult to account for the additional im-
portance of a particular function of the initial relative distance from a
40 percent female share in lists and towns where the quota was binding
using alternative explanations.
In column 2 we use Dki  ð0.4 2 FemShki,03Þ as an instrument for the
endogenous regressor of interest: DFemShki, the change in the share of
women in party k of municipality i between 2003 and 2007. The inclu-
sion of municipal fixed effects signifies that we are looking at relative
changes in vote and female shares within municipalities. Overall, the
identification strategy is conceptually based on triple-differencing the
data and considering simultaneously differences in vote shares by party
between 2003 and 2007,17 differences in propensities to introducing16 Note, therefore, that the empirical strategy is not based on comparing lists with many
initial female candidates to lists with few. Rather, we are conditioning on the initial number
of women and comparing parties affected by the quota to nonaffected parties.
17 Note that some lists dropped from contention in 2007, and some new lists appeared;
however, the probability of attrition or new list formation was orthogonal to the application
of the quota ðCasas-Arce and Saiz 2011Þ.
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Allmore females on the lists between quota and nonquota towns in 2007,
and relative differences in how far from the quota each party was in 2003
within its municipality. The results suggest that a party that was forced to
increase its female share by 10 percentage points more than its oppo-
nents experienced a 4.2 percentage point gain, which would, on average,
imply 53 votes shifting party allegiance out of about 2,500 cast. While the
effect is relatively modest, we can reject the hypothesis that parties that
were fielding fewer women did so to maximize their electoral results.
In column 3 we exclude towns with bipartisan elections and male
holdout lists in order to make sure that we are not solely exploiting the
same source of variance as in tables 3 and 4. The results are unchanged.
Note that our research design is not based on a regression disconti-
nuity because the outcome ðvote sharesÞ cannot possibly change in the
aggregate across both sides of the boundary that defines the quota
ðpopulation 5,000Þ and because of the heterogeneity and interdepen-
dence of the “treatment dosage” across observations. Nevertheless, it is
still interesting to analyze whether or not the results are sensitive to fo-
cusing on municipalities that are very close in terms of population. Con-
cretely, in column 4 of table 5, we limit our attention to municipalities
with populations between 4,000 and 6,000. The 2SLS results are broadly
similar to previous ones, but standard errors are about 2.5 times as large
as the ones in the baseline estimation ðcol. 2Þ and the instruments are
consequently weaker. These features are solely driven by the smaller
sample size ðfewer than one in 10 of the original municipalitiesÞ: param-
eter estimates do not change much, but standard errors steadily decrease
as we go on increasing sample sizes on both sides of the population
distribution.
Finally, we separate municipal elections on the basis of their degree
of competitiveness ðcols. 5 and 6Þ. We operationalize a definition of
noncompetitive municipalities as those where the largest party obtained
seven or more seats ðout of a maximum total of 13Þ in 2003, an absolute
majority. Parties with severe agency conflicts would be less likely to sur-
vive in very competitive electoral environments. Hence, we would expect
parties to represent the preferences of voters more closely in competitive
elections ðBesley and Case 2003Þ. Consistent with this, parties seem to
have deviated more from the optimal candidate mix in noncompetitive
environments ðcol. 5Þ and gained larger voter shares when forced to
field more women.1818 The one-sided test with the hypothesis that the coefficient on competitive munici-
palities is larger yields a t-statistic of 1.511 and—given the large sample—a p -statistic of .065.
Alternative definitions of noncompetitive environments—such as a high Herfindahl index
in initial vote shares or the difference between the party with the most votes and its closest
competitor—always yield the same picture: parties with “exogenously forced” women
improved their electoral performance more strongly in less competitive towns.
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women and power 661D. Availability of Willing Women, Voter Turnout,
and Other Margins of Adjustment
Our results so far point to the presence of agency problems with party
leaders that limit women’s political careers. We now conduct further
tests for other explanations.
One concern with our earlier results is that the quota forced some
parties ðespecially those with few womenÞ to drop out of the 2007 elec-
tions because of a lack of female candidates. In our earlier working pa-
per ðCasas-Arce and Saiz 2011Þ, we show that there was no effect on list
attrition or increased difficulty in forming new lists: even lists in quota mu-
nicipalities with no female candidates at the start were no more likely to
drop out of the elections after the quota.
If qualified women had been scarce, another margin of adjustment for
parties could have been to increase the retention rate of incumbent fe-
male candidates. Since we have the full names of candidates, we can trace
their participation across years and lists. Interestingly, in nonquota mu-
nicipalities, the probability that a woman had already been on a party’s list
in the previous election—32 percent—was much lower than the equiva-
lent percentage for men—43.55 percent. Women candidates experienced
more turnover between elections than men, a fact that is not explained
by their position on the list ðsimilar results are obtained conditioning on
rank in the listÞ. Therefore, if qualified women candidates were truly
scarce, one would expect more efforts geared toward increasing their re-
tention rate. In panel A of table 6, we estimate linear probabilistic models
in which the observations are all candidates in the 2007 election ðpost-
quotaÞ. The left-hand-side ðdependentÞ variable is a dummy or indicator
variable describing an attribute of each candidate within a party. The main
independent variable is a dummy for municipalities where the quota was
binding. We control for population polynomials ðcubicÞ that differ across
both sides of the level that enforces the quota ðpopulation at 5,000Þ and
party and regional fixed effects. In column 1 the dummy variable takes
value one if the candidate is a woman. In column2 thedependent variable
is a dummy that takes value one if the candidate is a woman appearing on
the list for the first time in 2007. The coefficient estimates in the latter
column are similar to those in the former ðif anything, higherÞ, suggesting
that parties did not fill the new female positions required by the quota by
increasing retention but rather by bringing in new women candidates.19
In columns 3 and 4 we repeat these regressions, focusing on the top five
positions. While the quota required more female candidates overall, par-
ties could have easily shifted incumbent lower-ranked candidates to the19 Notice that all women in newly formed parties are new candidates. For this reason,
and although party attrition and formation are unrelated to the quota, the regressions
concentrate on those lists that were present in both the 2003 and 2007 elections.
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Alltop positions. What we find, however, is that most of these top five posi-
tions were actually filled with new women candidates. When parties were
forced to place women in top positions, they did not experience diffi-
culties filling their lists, and new women stepped in to take on the chal-
lenge.20 This evidence from Spain is highly consistent with the evidence
from French municipalities after the introduction of a parity law that es-
tablished a 50 percent female quota. Bird ð2003Þ finds that according
to a survey of 600 mayoral candidates in France, “78 per cent considered
that it was ‘easy’ to apply the parity law in selecting candidates for their
lists” ð15Þ.
In panel B of table 6, we consider voter turnout by municipality. If
voters disliked female candidates, general animus against lists with more
women could be expressed via lower voter turnout. In fact, turnout
seemed to be higher in municipalities with more women on the lists be-
fore the quota ðcol. 1Þ after controlling for observables ðnumber of par-
ties, Herfindahl index of vote shares, and a polynomial in populationÞ.
Social capital—as measured by voter turnout—and female representa-
tion were positively associated, a finding that we flag for future research.
Moreover, when looking at the change in voter participation vis-a`-vis the
change in the aggregate share of female candidates ðinstrumented by
the interaction between a quota dummy and 40 percent minus the town’s
share of female candidates in 2003Þ, we find a positive—but statistically
insignificant—effect of female candidates on turnout ðcol. 2Þ. We conclude
that the presence of female candidates on the lists did not reduce voter
turnout.
The bulk of the evidence is therefore not consistent with either the
existence of major supply constraints on qualified female candidates prior
to the quota or the existence of voter preferences for male candidates.21 It
suggests that for most parties the strategy of increasing the number of
female candidates was feasible and profitable. Nonetheless, party leaders
failed to implement it before the quota was imposed. Although the evi-
dence does not directly speak to the mechanism through which this oc-
curs, it suggests the existence of agency problems within some parties that
harm female participation.20 Casas-Arce and Saiz ð2011Þ also show that the new women candidates on the lists were
not more likely to have surnames or names associated with a higher socioeconomic status,
suggesting that the quality of female candidates did not increase.
21 Of course, the latter could be a reflection of male voters becoming more disengaged
together with a compensatory increase in female voter participation. Note that the origin of
the voters should not matter to conclude that parties were not following vote-maximizing
strategies. Furthermore, we did not find prima facie empirical support for a hypothesis based
on differences in postquota gender turnout. While the vote is secret and we will never be able
to know the identity of voters, we tried to find significant differences in outcomes across towns
with relatively larger shares of female registered voters in Casas-Arce and Saiz ð2011Þ; we did
not find any.
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women and power 665V. Conclusion
Using a natural experiment provided by the introduction of female
quotas in Spain, we show that parties modestly gained vote share when
more women were mandated onto their lists. The results demonstrate
that forcing parties to accept more women through quotas can increase
female participation without necessarily decreasing their electability.
They also suggest that agency problems between party leaders and voters
are important in accounting for female underrepresentation.
We also find that women were much less likely to run at the top of lists
that were highly likely to win seats in the local councils. Therefore—as in
Sanbonmatsu ð2002Þ, Murray ð2008Þ, Bagues and Esteve-Volart ð2010Þ,
and Verge and de la Fuente ð2014Þ—the evidence suggests that internal
party dynamics seem to be especially at play against women when power
is at stake. The results are consistent with local party leaders implicitly
discriminating against women by not engaging them often enough ðBird
2003; Lawless and Fox 2005Þ. They could also be explained by the en-
dogenous emergence of rent-seeking male coalitions within the parties
ðReuben et al. 2010Þ. Alternatively, the results could indicate that women
are effective at generating political ideas and enticing voters but are less
adept at elbowing out internal party competitors.
We also find that the agency problems between party leaders and vot-
ers aremore pronounced in noncompetitive elections. Hence, the results
suggest that an alternative to the use of quotas to increase female repre-
sentation might be to increase competition in the electoral process. In
fact, women’s representation is much larger in proportional electoral sys-
tems ðNorris 2006; Norris and Krook 2011Þ, where each vote counts, as op-
posed to majoritarian systems, where many seats are de facto owned and
noncompetitively allocated by the leadership of the locally dominant
party, especially after redistricting. Affecting the behavior of political ma-
chines vis-a`-vis gender issues andunderstandinghowcompetition changes
internal party dynamics could thus be key to improving women’s chances
at equal participation. We leave the exploration of these hypotheses for
future research.References
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